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The Second Encirclement Campaign () against Jiangxi Soviet was a series of battles launched by the Chinese Nationalist Government in the hope of encircling and destroying the Jiangxi Soviet after the previous campaign had failed. The Red Army repelled the encirclement by launching their Second Counter-Encirclement Campaign (), also called by the communists as the Second Counter-Encirclement Campaign at Central Revolutionary Base (), in which the local Chinese Red Army successfully defended the Jiangxi Soviet against the Nationalist attacks from April 1, 1931, to May 31, 1931. ==Strategies== TIME magazine reported that on Jan. 26, 1931, Chinag Kai-shek ordered an offensive launched on January 19 by the 18th army division, when the Red Army managed to encircle it, they gave up their weapons along with the defection of the entire division to the Communist side. 100,000 were reported killed by the Communists. The communists demanded that 2 Million Mexican dollars be paid for the release of the divisional Commander Chang Chi-tsan, Chiang responded with a renewed 4 division offensive. After the defeat of the first encirclement campaign, the nationalists quickly regrouped and prepared for the second encirclement campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet. In February 1931, Chiang Kai-shek named He Yingqing the acting commander-in-chief and deployed nineteen divisions totaling over 200,000 troops for the second encirclement. The nationalists completed their planned deployment by late March 1931. In contrast, the communists were slow to develop their own strategies because of internal power struggles. Wang Ming’s protégé Xiang Ying had reached the Jiangxi Soviet after the third planetary session of the sixth national conference of the Communist Party of China, and on January 15, 1931, the communist Jiangxi Soviet (Communist) Central Bureau for political administration and the Central Military Commission were formed. Xiang Ying became the head of both organizations, as party secretary of the bureau and chairman of the commission. Zhu De and Mao Zedong lost power, as both were only named as deputy chairmen of the commission - though Zhu was named as the commander-in-chief and Mao was named as the political commissar of the 1st Front Army of the Chinese Red Army. Mao was also named as the director of the general political directorate. Xiang Ying’s power was further strengthened in April 1931, when Wang Ming’s delegation reached the Jiangxi Soviet to assist him to lead. As a result, the communists disagreed on the strategies that should be taken in countering the upcoming nationalist encirclement campaign. The communist leadership dominated by Wang Ming and represented by Xiang Ying decided on strategies consisted of following principles: *Concentrate numerically superior force to destroy the enemy before they grouped together. *Luring the enemy deep into the communist base was a strategy that only applied to the early stages, and communist force should attack the nationalist dominated regions to destroy the enemy instead. *When necessary, Jiangxi Soviet should be abandoned in an attempt to establish new communist bases elsewhere. Given the strength of the communist force at the time, this impractical strategy was obviously out of touch with reality and faced strong opposition. Some members of Wang Ming’s own camp even disagreed, and suggested the alternative strategy of separating the communist force to defeat enemy at the multiple fronts. Obviously, this alternative strategy was equally out of touch with reality and at the conference of the communist Central Bureau held from March to April 1931, it could not be decided whether to engage the nationalist 19th Route Army first, or the nationalist 6th Route Army first. With the support of most commanders, Mao Zedong opposed both impractical strategies developed by the newly arrived protégés of Wang Ming. Mao reasoned the nationalist 6th Army, 19th Army and 26th Army were some of the strongest armies among nationalist forces, and thus were difficult targets. In contrast, the 43rd Division, 47th Division, and 54th Division of the nationalist 5th Army were just newly arrived from north, while the 28th Division and 77th Division of the nationalist 5th Army were previously defeated by the communists in the last encirclement campaign, thus they were weak and less enthusiastic in actively engaging communist forces, hence should be engaged first by the communists. In the meantime, if the communists were to strike westward from the east, the Gan River would be a limit. If the communists were to strike eastward from Rich Field (Futian, 富田) in the west, then not only there would not be any geographic limits, but regions in the border of Fujian and Jiangxi including Lichuan (黎川), Taining, (泰宁), Jianning, (建宁) would likely to fall into communist hands more easily, resulting in expanding the communist base. Therefore, communists should adopt the same successful strategies proven in the last encirclement campaign, and Mao’s idea was accepted by everyone after lengthy debates. On March 23, 1931, communist forces withdrew to regions including Eternal Abundance, (Yongfeng, 永丰), Yue’an, (乐安), Yihuang (宜黄) and Nanfeng, at the northern border of the Jiangxi Soviet to regions in the south, including Guangchang (广昌), Shicheng, Ningdu and Ruijin. Massive mobilization efforts were conducted to mobilize local population to defend the communist base. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Second Encirclement Campaign against Jiangxi Soviet」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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